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1. Introduction 
The problems of people fleeing from one country to another, also known as refugees, to escape 
war have rather been well reported in the media throughout the years. However, the issues that 
the internally displaced persons (IDPs) face - people who escape hardships but stay within their 
home country, are largely underexposed. In this thesis I compare the case of IDPs in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina with that of Sudan. 
With the outbreak of the war on the Balkans in the nineties, the Socialist Republic of 
Yugoslavia came to an end. Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence in 1992 after 
Croatia and Slovenia parted from Yugoslavia before it. After that, civil war started in the newly 
declared nation state. This would not only lead to casualties, crimes against humanity and 
genocide, but also to the displacement of many of the inhabitants of the country to other nation 
states in the world as refugees. In Western Europe these people were granted temporary 
protection after a resolution declared vulnerable groups had a right to a safe haven outside their 
home country.1 This was not the same as a refugee status according to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.2 The declaration of this resolution was a way to respond to sudden mass 
immigrations in and to Europe, as was the case with the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
most important part of this resolution was that it became easier for European Union member 
states to end a temporary protection regime and have people return when the situation in the 
home country allowed it.3 However, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a complex 
one, and as a result many European Union countries did not demand people to return after the 
war ended. The UNHCR wrote a report in which they formulated guidelines which refugee 
receiving countries should follow. The main objectives were to promote and make possible the 
sustainable return to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to keep providing protection if people could 
not return.4 In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there still are reasons why refugees cannot 
or do not want to return. If people were to return to parts of the country where they are part of 
a minority ethnic group they could face discrimination on all levels.5 This is not only the case 
for refugees, but also for IDPs.  
                                                          
1 United Nations, The Resolution on Certain Common Guidelines as Regards the Admission of Particularly 
Vulnerable Groups of Persons from the Former Yugoslavia. Adopted by the EC Ministers responsible for 
immigration in Copenhagen (Copenhagen 1993). 
2 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva 1951). 
3 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Position on Categories of Persons from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Who Are in Continued Need of International Protection (Brussels 1998). 
4 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Global Report 2000 (Brussels 2000). 
5 UNHCR, UNHCR Global Report 2000. 
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Ever since independence, Sudan has known decades of civil war and very little to no 
peace. The conflict in Darfur, the western region of the country, has been well documented 
especially since the turn of the millennium. The newspaper article of Klaas van Dijken, who 
won a Dutch news reporting award with his article on a group of IDPs in Darfur was a story on 
the horrible experiences of people in the region.6 In his article he wrote how more than ten 
thousand people were trapped in a cave with no food, water and safety. Villages in the region 
were constantly bombed by government forces, government supported militias raided villages 
and specifically targeted, killed and intimidated innocent civilians. There was little outside help 
for these people since many areas in Darfur were difficult to reach because of the poor 
infrastructure.7 Sudan is a country with one of the largest numbers of IDPs in the world and, 
similar to Bosnia and Herzegovina, their displacement has ethnic grounds. However, for Sudan 
specifically, the hardships of the Darfur region only tell a small part of the story of the country. 
In many other parts of Sudan, the central government in the capital of Khartoum are guilty of 
the same atrocities committed against their population as in Darfur.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan are two similar countries on different continents. 
Both have known stagnation and ethnic conflicts since independence from Yugoslavia and 
British colonial rule. In order to change things for the better and realise a sustainable future, the 
international community has done a lot of work in both countries, but so far they have been 
unable to find solutions to their problems. Why they have been unsuccessful is what I find out 
with this thesis. With this thesis on IDPs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan I will answer 
the following research question: why is the international community powerless to solve the IDP 
issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan? In order to answer the main question, it is 
necessary set up chapters that go into theoretical, historiographical and contextual aspects 
concerning IDPs and the history of both countries. Finally, an analytical question closely related 
to the main question will be answered on the developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Sudan that will expose the insolubility of the issues in both countries. In order to analyse the 
influence of the international community in both countries on a migration management and 
policy level, I will use the reports from the non-profit non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
called the International Crisis Group (ICG) for this analysis. This is a smaller scope, meaning I 
can analyse migration management and policy Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan more 
closely. The research question is: despite years of efforts on the conducting of policy advices 
                                                          
6 Klaas van Dijken, ‘In een grot in Darfur afgesneden van alle hulp’, Trouw, March 13 2016, accessed May 18 
2017, https://www.trouw.nl/home/in-een-grot-in-darfur-afgesneden-van-alle-hulp~ad4d8e29/. 
7 Van Dijken, ‘In een grot in Darfur’. 
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to local governments and the international community by the ICG, why do the problems of 
IDPs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan remain unresolved? What the ICG does, when, 
why and by whom it was founded and what information they present will be discussed later in 
this thesis. 
 
1.1 Theory 
In this section I will discuss two sets of theories needed to answer the question I set up. The 
first set regards IDPs and theory on conflict and regime-induced displacement. This is set out 
in order to understand how IDPs are created and why they do not want to return on the 
grassroots level. The second set of theory is on migration management and policy, because the 
ICG is a NGO that focuses on giving local governments and the international community policy 
advice in conflict situations or to avoid conflict. Both are important to answer the questions of 
this thesis. 
IDPs are people who have fled their original homes and re-settled within the borders of 
their home country. They have not crossed borders to find safety but are, for whatever reason, 
on the run in their own nation state.8 They are not refugees, as defined by the Refugee 
Convention, because they did not cross international borders. The IDPs do not and cannot ask 
for asylum or go through refugee registration processes to be treated as a refugee in another 
country, making their problems less visible to the public.9 Their protection rests primarily on 
the shoulders of their own governments and local authorities.10 A problem does however occur 
when the government or local authorities are the reason people leave their homes and flee 
because of persecution, violence or violation of human rights and the need for safety. This kind 
of internal displacement is also called regime-induced displacement: the use of coercive force 
to displace the population by the government or military forces, according to Phil Orchard.11 
Regime-induced displacement is described as the new kind of war by Orchard. Governments 
try to control their populations by forcing people with a different ethnicity, culture and religion 
to flee through violence and terror. The difference with conflict-induced displacement is that 
civilians do not flee because they are caught between crossfires of two warring groups, but are 
                                                          
8 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Internally Displaced People. 
9 Sudha G. Rajput, ‘Internal Displacement: Simplifying a Complex Social Phenomenon’ (2013): accessed May 1 
2017, http://www.beyondintractability.org/rajput-internal-displacement. 
10 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Brussels 1998). 
11 Phil Orchard, ‘The Perils of Humanitarianism: Refugee and IDP Protection in Situations of Regime-induced 
Displacement’, Refugee Survey Quarterly 29/1 (2010): 38-60. 
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explicitly targeted by their government or rebels.12 In both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan 
regime-induced displacement has been used as a tactic to ethnically cleanse areas of the country. 
For the safety of IDPs, the UNHCR sets guidelines for the international community.13 In 2015, 
the UNHCR cared, in some way or another, for around 26 million IDPs worldwide who were 
in need of international help.14 The precise number of IDPs worldwide is difficult to trace, since 
it is not certain how many are for instance hiding.15 According to Orchard, international 
organisations like the UNHCR frequently lack capacity to provide IDPs protection from terror 
by their own state.16 Both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan are cases where either the central 
government or rebel forces not only displaced many civilians that they regarded as ethnically 
different from them, but also killed them, resulting in genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
accusations of the mass murder of various ethnic groups in Sudan. 
Many people from Bosnia and Herzegovina found safety in other countries, but a vast 
number of people sought safety within their own country. Bosnia and Herzegovina still has 
issues with people not being able to return, both within and outside the country. Shortly after 
the war, numbers showed that more than half a million people were registered as IDPs in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in 2000.17 A 2005 report showed that the numbers dropped significantly 
during this five year period, but that there were still 310,000 people who saw themselves as 
IDPs.18 Today there are still 98,000 people registered as IDPs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.19 As 
of June 2016, around 3,374,000 people were registered as IDPs in Sudan.20 In the neighbouring 
country of South Sudan, a country that has faced similar issues as Sudan since its independence 
from that country, 1,793,000 people were registered as IDPs.21 
The return of IDPs is difficult in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan for 
seven reasons. Firstly, IDPs sometimes choose not to return because of traumas and a 
                                                          
12 Phil Orchard, ‘The Perils of Humanitarianism’, 38-39. 
13 UNHCR, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 
14 UNHCR, Internally Displaced People. 
15 UNHCR, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 
16 Orchard, ‘The Perils of Humanitarianism’, 46. 
17 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Global Report 2000: Bosnia and Herzegovina (Brussels 
2000). 
18 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Bosnia and Herzegovina: Re-registration shows substantial 
drop in IDP numbers (Brussels 2005). 
19 Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ Accessed May 1 2017. 
http://www.internal-displacement.org/database/country/?iso3=BIH. 
20 Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. ‘Sudan.’ Accessed May 1 2017. http://www.internal-
displacement.org/database/country/?iso3=SDN. 
21 Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. ‘South Sudan.’ Accessed May 1 2017. http://www.internal-
displacement.org/database/country/?iso3=SSD. 
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continuing feeling of insecurity because they are part of a minority group within a city or region. 
Secondly, refugee and IDP return can be discouraged by the political atmosphere in a country 
which could lead to possible discrimination.22 Thirdly, they do not return because of the absence 
of economic opportunities. Displaced populations often experience poverty and limited access 
to social and health services, which is unfortunately a trend rather than an exception for almost 
everyone who returned or fled to IDP camps. In the fourth place, they may not be able to finance 
their return or the reconstruction of their original homes.23 In the fifth place, finding a job and 
reintegrating into the economy where there already is a very high rate of unemployment is 
particularly difficult for the IDPs who belongs to a minority ethnic group. In the sixth place, 
when returns occur, it is often the older population that moves back, which affects the dynamic 
of community life and in turn hampers the potential for economic activity and development in 
the area since these returns mean that there is not a labour force returning to a particular 
region.24 Younger IDPs could have built up their lives and social capital and have their home 
elsewhere. They no longer have connections with the place of origin of their parents or a desire 
to return there as much as the elders might still have.25 Finally, without significant return 
because of conflict, regions might be unable to support food needs, which leads to people 
remaining in IDP camps, with a majority depending on food aid.26 
 This thesis is also an analysis of migration management and policy and how 
international NGOs, like the ICG, and the international community can be influential on this 
matter either in a particular nation state or region. According to Victor Piché, Bimal Ghosh has 
been an important author on migration management. He was among the first to develop a 
systematic approach to migration, because he deemed free movement of people impracticable.27 
According to Piché migration management is the global governance of migration in order to 
achieve a more orderly and predictable movement of people.28 An article by Martin Geiger and 
Antoine Pécoud, published in 2014, also examined migration management. They argued that 
since the end of the Cold War it has become more desirable for nation states to cooperate 
                                                          
22 Pasic, ‘Political and Social Consequences’, 8. 
23 Serrano, ‘Property Rights and Reconstruction’, 19. 
24 Idem., 20. 
25 Lana Pasic, ‘Political and Social Consequences of Continuing Displacement in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Forced 
Migration Review 50 (2015): 6-10, 8. 
26 Idem., 42-44. 
27 Victor Piché, ‘Contemporary Migration Theories as Reflected in Their Founding Texts’, Population 68/1 
(2013): 141-164, 155 & Bimal Ghosh, ‘Towards a New International Regime For Orderly Movement of People’ in 
Managing Migration: Time For a New International Regime? (Oxford 2000). 
28 Piché, ‘Contemporary Migration Theories’, 155. 
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internationally on aspects like migration management and policy. This made it possible for 
regions to not have their security compromised and keep control over migrations like the one 
originating from the Balkans after the outbreak of the war.29 The protection regime I discussed 
in the introduction of this thesis is a good example of this. The arguments of Geiger and Pecoud 
are in line with what Piché identifies as migration management.  NGOs are advisers for both 
the international community and governments of nation states on topics like migration 
management and policy. They have access to data, information and have the right to establish 
themselves in a nation state or region in crisis and therefore have authority to give an overview 
of the situation, point out the challenges a country or region faces and give advice and possible 
solutions to governing bodies.30 Since NGOs are not affiliated with government organisations, 
they have the possibility to think outside the box and can come with suggestions that are more 
daring.31 However, the success of an international NGOs relies on the willingness of governing 
bodies to apply the advice they give.32 Piché argues that migration management in reality has 
been a means to counter the irregular movement of people in todays globalised world. 
Governments and international organisations have implemented more effective policing of 
borders in order to stop illegal migration and control refugee flows. Fear of large waves of these 
kinds of migrations and not having the possibility to manage it is what drives the 
implementation of restrictive measures today.33 
 This concludes the theoretical section. The two sets of theory presented will allow to 
explain in this thesis why IDPs are on the run in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan, why they 
do not or cannot return and how what the impact of the international community is in both 
countries. 
 
1.2 Historiography Bosnia and Herzegovina 
In the next two sections I will set out what has already been written on IDPs in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Sudan. This is an important part of this thesis, because it shows why the 
sources of the ICG provide more insight or lack a broader understanding of the countries. The 
body of work on IDPs in Bosnia and Herzegovina is very broad and articles on the topic often 
                                                          
29 Martin Geiger & Antoine Pécoud, ‘International Organisations and the Politics of Migration’, Journal of Ethnic 
& Migration Studies 40/6 (2014): 865-887, 869. 
30 Geiger & Pécoud, ‘International Organisations’, 876. 
31 Idem., 870. 
32 Idem., 874. 
33 Piché, ‘Contemporary Migration Theories’, 155. 
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have similar outcomes.34 I used three articles from Lana Pasic, Inmaculada Serrano and Claudia 
Meyerhoefer for this historiography which were all published in the Forced Migration Review 
in 2015. These articles give a recent, broader overview on the topic of IDPs in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.35 
Lana Pasic wrote in her article that more than twenty years after the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, the agreement that stopped the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the failure to 
install effective refugee and IDP return have had a social and political impact at both community 
and state level in the country. Two million people, almost half the population of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina at the time, became displaced and one million people were internally displaced. 
Although the Dayton Peace Agreement had a section on the return of refugees and IDPs, twenty 
years after the agreement was signed the impact of displacement still affects Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on a social, political and economic level.36 According to Inmaculada Serrano, the 
overwhelming majority of returnees moved to places where their ethnic group was the majority. 
The return of IDPs who would now be a minority group in their original region or city, only 
picked up early in the twenty-first century and not long after that it was evident that most of the 
returns were not because people wanted to stay permanently. Serrano discussed in her article 
that people only returned and registered in their place of origin for the purpose of having the 
ability to sell their property to others who would be interested in their homes.37 Pasic showed 
this was for example the case for Serbs living in Sarajevo, who tended to re-settle in the 
neighbourhood of the city which was also part of Republika Srpska, where the majority ethnic 
group was Serb Orthodox.38 These arguments are in accordance with the theory, because 
returnees fear discrimination as a minority. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was ethnically the most diverse, mixed state in former 
Yugoslavia, with what was believed to be a high degree of mutual respect, tolerance and 
coexistence between Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. The displacement of large numbers of people 
during the civil war, caused demographic changes in the ethnic composition of towns and 
                                                          
34 See for example: Charles B. Philpott, ‘From the Right to Return to the Return of Rights: Completing Post-War 
Property Restitution in Bosnia Herzegovina’, International Journal of Refugee Law 18/1 (2006): 30-80; Danilo 
Rakic, ‘The Overview of the Status and Prospective of Internally Displaced Persons on the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia’, Temida 7/4 (2004): 57-60; Cecile Sabatier, ‘A Note From Bosnia and Herzegovina: Leading a 
Displaced Life’, Human Rights Quarterly 33/2 (2011): 397-201. 
35 Forced Migration Review 50 (2015). 
36 Lana Pasic, ‘Political and Social Consequences of Continuing Displacement in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Forced 
Migration Review 50 (2015): 6-10, 7. 
37 Inmaculada Serrano, ‘Property Rights and Reconstruction in the Bosnian Return Process’, Forced Migration 
Review 50 (2015): 18-22, 19-20. 
38 Pasic, ‘Political and Social Consequences’, 8. 
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villages. With the Dayton Peace Agreement, the creators and signatories tried to arrange the 
return of minorities to the entities in the new nation state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, 
with the Dayton Peace Agreement, this was made a very difficult or impossible task. With the 
agreement an ethnic homogeneity of regions in Bosnia and Herzegovina was created that did 
not exist before the civil war. According to Claudia Meyerhoefer, the result of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement was the creation of separate, nearly completely mono-ethnic communities. There 
was little to no interaction, debate and contact between the ethnic groups living in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In cases where minority returns had occurred, the high levels of mistrust towards 
others and in some cases ethnic intolerance remained as evident as they were during the war, 
with little potential for building strong and integrated communities.39 This shows that the theory 
is correct: minorities are in danger of being discriminated against in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
  The reason that there is a lack of reconciliation among the peoples of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the fact that IDPs still have difficulties to return home or do not want to, is 
shortly discussed by Claudia Meyerhoefer in her article on the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
However, the literature used in this section does not give details on why the agreement has left 
the country in an inoperable state. This is not only the case on the grassroots level as discussed 
in the literature, but also on the constitutional, legislative level within the political atmosphere 
of nationalism and segregation since the civil war ended. Besides that, the solution of two 
entities within the overarching nation state that was formed with the Dayton Peace Agreement 
keeps the tensions of the civil war at the heart of politics in the country. This is not clarified by 
Meyerhoefer in her article, but will be discussed later in this thesis. 
 
1.3 Historiography Sudan 
In this section I will discuss what has already been written on IDPs in Sudan. The most 
authoritative author on the topic of Sudan is Jok Madut Jok. With his book Sudan: Race, 
Religion and Violence he explicitly elaborates on the problems of IDPs.40 His findings will be 
discussed first in this section. Second, Francis Mading Deng dedicated a whole chapter on the 
problematic case of IDPs in both Sudan and South Sudan in his book Bound by Conflict: 
Dilemmas of the Two Sudans.41 Lastly, a significant number of articles has been written on the 
                                                          
39 Claudia Meyerhoefer, ‘Voices in Displacement’, Forced Migration Review 50 (2015): 16-20, 17. 
40 Jok Madut Jok, Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence (London 2015). 
41 Francis Mading Deng, Bound by Conflict: Dilemmas of the Two Sudans (New York 2015). 
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IDP camps in Sudan and their everyday life, collecting of revenue and aid from international 
organisations.  
 In Sudan displacement is mostly regime-induced, as it is in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
For both countries this is in accordance with the theory from Phil Orchard.42 Peoples were 
targeted and chased from their homes because of their ethnic background. In his book, Jok 
Madut Jok showed that the central Government of Sudan in Khartoum explicitly targeted 
civilians as a tactic to disrupt everyday life and take away potential support to rebel forces. He 
calls it the scorched earth tactics. Either the army of the central government in Khartoum or 
militia groups supported by the government destroyed villages in rebel territory, forcing its 
inhabitants to flee and look for shelter in IDP camps.43 Francis Mading Deng dedicated a whole 
chapter on the IDPs in both Sudan and South Sudan in Bound by Conflict.44 After the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which finally put an end to the fighting between the central 
government and rebel forces in the south of Sudan, the parties also agreed that both required to 
guard a safe and sustainable return for IDPs and refugees to their homes. Sadly, this was not 
guaranteed or taken care of by both the central government and former rebel forces. IDPs were 
badly informed about the situation back home by local governments. International supervising 
organisations like the United Nations and the African Union argued that besides transportation 
there was little adequate preparation for the return of a large number of people to their original 
villages.45 The southern government never visited camps in and around the capital to explain 
IDPs their rights or facilitate and finance organised returns for IDPs back home.46 
Lastly, a great number of articles has been written on everyday life in IDP camps in 
Sudan. The topics range from social phobia among IDPs, their opportunities for creating 
sustainable livelihoods and the work of international NGOs in these camps. In their article on 
long-term IDPs in Sudan, Tarig Salah, Touraj Ayazi, Lars Lien, Arne Eide and Edvard Hauff 
argued that social phobia was common among those that are displaced for a long period.47 
Especially among women and those with only elementary school or no education, the 
percentage of social phobia was high.48 In their article ‘No Way Back’, Helen Young and Karen 
                                                          
42 Phil Orchard, The Perils of Humanitarianism’. 
43 Jok, Sudan, 166. 
44 Deng, Bound by Conflict. 
45 Idem., 121-122. 
46 Idem., 124-126. 
47 Tarig Taha Mohamed Salah, Touraj Ayazi, Lars Lien, Arne Eide and Edvard Hauff, ‘Social Phobia Among Long-
term Internally Displaced Persons: An Epidemiological Study of Adults in Two Internally Displaced Person 
Settlements in Sudan’, International Journal of Social Psychiatry 61/6 (2015): 550-559. 
48 Mohamed, Ayazi, Lien, Eide and Hauff, ‘Social Phobia’, 556. 
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Jacobsen discussed the adaptation and opportunities for IDPs in their new environment in 
camps in Sudan for the people of the Darfur region.49 Historically, the Fur of the Darfur region 
had rural livelihood systems, which included sedentary farming and transhumant pastoralism, 
adapted to the local environment of Darfur. Because of commercialization and privatization of 
production in the region, pressure on and competition between pastoralists and farmers 
increased significantly, sometimes leading to conflict between different ethnic groups. Mark 
Duffield’s article discussed how IDPs from the south of Sudan were affected by aid programs 
by international organisations and NGOs in northern IDP camps.50 He argued that even though 
international organisations and NGO’s are necessary in IDP camps in order to keep some 
security, aid organisations actually forced IDPs in to wider systems of exploration and 
oppression by the central government. Instead of helping southerners in the north, international 
organisations and NGOs promoted a shift in economic activities from livestock and farming to 
wage labour.51  
Richard Hill, Kari Diener, Sue Miller and Thomas White wrote a similar article to 
Duffield on the livelihood programs of NGO’s in IDP camps in Darfur and how they affected 
the inhabitants.52 They especially addressed security programs, which included the protection 
of individuals against injury, harm or violence from others and damage or seizure of livelihoods 
and assets.53 Finally, Devanna de la Puente’s article on women’s participation in IDP camps in 
Darfur needs mentioning because of its rare gender perspective on life in Sudan.54 Many women 
lost their husbands or sons during the war and they became the victim of rape, torture and abuse. 
In this situation the window of opportunity opened up for women to take on decision making 
roles.55 The gender perspective on life in camps for IDPs in Sudan is interesting and definitely 
needs more attention, but it will not be further analysed in this thesis. 
The work on IDPs in Sudan discussed in this historiography has one thing in common: 
none of the authors go beyond the descriptive character and grassroots level and lack a 
discussion on sustainable solutions for IDPs on a management and policy level. Only Francis 
                                                          
49 Helen Young and Karen Jacobsen, ‘No Way Back? Adaptation and Urbanization of IDP Livelihoods in the 
Darfur Region of Sudan’, Development and Change 44/1 (2013): 125-145. 
50 Mark Duffield, ‘Aid and Complicity: the Case of War-displaced Southerners in Northern Sudan’, Journal of 
Modern African Studies 40/1 (2002): 83-104. 
51 Idem., 84-89. 
52 Richard Hill, Kari Jorgensen Diener, Sue Miller and Thomas White, ‘IDP Livelihoods and Personal Security: 
Case Studies From Colombia and Sudan’, Refugee Survey Quarterly 25/2 (2006): 40-59. 
53 Hill, Jorgensen Diener, Miller and White, ‘IDP Livelihoods and Personal Security’, 41. 
54 Devanna de la Puente, ‘Women’s Leadership in Camps for Internally Displaced People in Darfur, Western 
Sudan, Community Development Journal 46/3 (2011) 365-377. 
55 Idem., 366-369. 
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Mading Deng specifically touched upon the subject with his chapter on IDPs in his book. The 
International Crisis Group, whose reports are the primary sources in this thesis, present policy 
advices for possible solutions for Sudan’s problems. Together with the findings of Jok Madut 
Jok and the contextual literature, I will argue that an understanding of the colonial context of 
Sudan is crucial in order to grasp the complexities of the country. 
 
1.4 Material and Method 
In this section I discuss my primary source: the reports by the ICG. These reports not only 
discuss the cultural, grassroots aspect of why IDPs have found it difficult to return or do not 
want to go back. They also go deeper into the constitutional and political aspect of the problems 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan. The reports go beyond a merely descriptive character 
and conduct policy advices and possible solutions for both local governments and the 
international community in both countries. Its goals, who founded it and when, where it is 
stationed, how it is financed as well as why I have chosen its reports for my analytical part will 
be outlined in this section. I also discuss articles on issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan 
to point out useful insights for my research. 
The ICG is an international NGO with prevention of war, deadly conflict, and the 
advocating of peace as its main goal. It does so by setting up the building blocks to help 
countries and the international community that help a country in crisis to overcome crisis 
situations. The ICG is an organisation with a high influence in advocating peace, policy making 
and implementing policies in conflict and post-conflict situations around the world. The ICG 
tries to achieve peace and stability by advocating good governance and inclusive politics. 
Besides that, it provides independent analysis and give advice and possible solutions to 
countries in need of their help and the international community that tries to aid countries in 
crisis. This is, among other strategies, its way to prevent war and conflict.56  
NGO’s have the advantage of making solutions work or put them into practice by being 
on the ground and having a perceived neutrality and experience on specific matters compared 
to local governments and international governmental organisations like the UN. They also 
increasingly operate outside frameworks and more independently from governmental 
organisations. The fact that NGO’s are not military forces works to their advantage.57 The ICG 
                                                          
56 International Crisis Group. ‘Preventing War, Shaping Peace.’ Accessed May 1 2017. 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/who-we-are. 
57 P. J. Simmons, ‘Learning to Live With NGOs’, Foreign Policy 112 (1998): 82-96, 87-88. 
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are an NGO with boots on the ground in crisis situations, but its independence and neutrality 
are questionable because they have large Western donors and mostly white Western employees. 
The ICG was founded in January 1993 after a meeting between former US-diplomat and then 
president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Morton Abramowitz and the later 
World Bank president Mark Malloch as a response to the international community’s difficulty 
to find sustainable solutions to the ongoing civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their 
headquarters are in Brussels.58 Its current president and CEO is Jean-Marie Guéhenno, a former 
French diplomat who served as a policy planner at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in France. 
He also served as the United Nations Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations 
from 2000 to 2008.59 Shortly after the war ended in Bosnia in Herzegovina and two years after 
establishment, the ICG set up their headquarters in the capital Sarajevo and analysed the state 
of affairs in the country at various points in time. The ICG started monitoring the state of affairs 
in Sudan from January 2002.60  
Despite its presence in policy making and crisis situations, Berit Bliesemann de Guevara 
underscores that the ICG has rarely been an object of study.61 Her article is indeed the only 
extensive article to be found on the NGO. Bliesemann de Guevara states that the funding of the 
ICG mainly rests on Western governments, foundations and organisations (United Nations, 
European Union and World Bank), possibly undermining its independence and neutrality. 
However, the ICG are highly influential in policy making. Its policy makers are mostly 
authoritative people who have taken important roles in other NGO’s, international organisations 
and governments in their career before joining the ICG. The fact that its employees have the 
possibility to do field work in crisis situations also sets them apart from other NGOs in the 
policy advisory field.62 It is true that the success of the ICG might not be as big as they 
themselves argue according to Bliesemann de Guevara. She states that it probably over 
exaggerates its impact as a form of marketing to keep their donors and have the right to exist as 
an organisation.63 The ICG is indeed ranked as one of the top policy making organisations in 
the world, but Bliesemann de Guevara argues that this is probably due to its symbolic capital: 
                                                          
58 International Crisis Group, Fifteen Years on the Frontline, 1995-2010 (Brussels 2010), 10-13. 
59 International Crisis Group. ‘Jean-Marie Guéhenno.’ Accessed May 23 2017. 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/who-we-are/people/jean-marie-guehenno.  
60 International Crisis Group. ‘Sudan.’ Accessed May 1 2017. https://www.crisisgroup.org/latest-
updates/reports-and-briefings?location[]=14. 
61 Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, ‘‘Studying the International Crisis Group’, Third World Quarterly 35/4 (2014): 
545-562, 547. 
62 Bliesemann de Guevara, ‘Studying the International Crisis Group’, 550-551. 
63 Idem., 558. 
14 
 
the experienced expert employees it has hired to differentiate them from other NGOs in the 
same field.64 The most important argument that Bliesemann de Guevara makes in her article on 
the work of the ICG is on local power constellations. She argues that a focus on national actors 
and groups and their interests may well lead to other conclusions that those of the ICG, who are 
locked in a Western international scope.65 This argument is crucial for the analytical part of this 
thesis. 
The ICG is not the only organisation that published reports on issues in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Sudan. Other similar international organisations that documented the 
problems the countries faced were the Red Cross, the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).66 All 
these organisations discussed various subjects and gave advice not only to the international 
community on how to deal with problematic issues, but also to political leaders in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Sudan itself. However, unlike the reports from the ICG, the reports from the 
other organisations did not discuss the problem of IDPs persons as broadly. Many of the reports 
from the ICG analysed the problems IDPs faced in Bosnia and Herzegovina, either as its main 
subject or in combination with governance and political issues in the country that unfortunately 
ensure that the problems still exist to this day. Especially shortly after the war until the 
beginning of the twenty-first century the ICG has extensively analysed the issue of IDPs in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The reports by the ICG differ from the articles discussed above, 
because they also analyse the constitutional level rather than only the grassroots level. This 
perspective helps to understand the current political climate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
makes it difficult for IDPs to return home. For this thesis, I only selected the reports from the 
ICG that either have the issue of IDPs in Bosnia and Herzegovina as its main subject or 
discusses it in combination with the current governance and political structure of the country. 
These reports were published between 1996 and 2002. A final report, which was published in 
2014, also has recommendations that are useful to achieve a solution IDPs in Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina in the future.67 I will discuss these reports in the analytical chapter of this thesis 
and I will emphasize the arguments that are crucial to explain the issues that IDPs still face in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and leaves them in doubt whether they can ever return. Return of 
minorities would be the crucial measure for the international community in order to reverse the 
ethnic cleansing of the civil war. The ICG would also make numerous advices to the 
international community and local governments on this matter. An article by Anders Steffanson 
on property restitution analysed this subject of minority return extensively.68 He argued that it 
merely became ‘a numbers game’ for the international community to have minorities return 
without looking at quality of return and no regard for their lives and future while living in 
majority ethnic areas. It became the ultimate goal to reverse ethnic segregation.69 However, the 
international community overlooked the importance of the nationalistic political landscape and 
how it restricted or blocked minority returns and enforced ethnically cleansed areas. The ICG 
would eventually report on this matter and stress that the political landscape after the Dayton 
Peace Agreement minimised or prevented minority returns, but only six years after the war. 
 In the case of Sudan the reports from the ICG do not discuss the problems of IDPs as 
broadly as for Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, since the use of violence by the central 
government in Sudan is undeniably linked with the use of the scorched earth tactics to displace 
peoples from marginalized periphery regions, whenever conflict, war or violence are discussed 
in the reports of the ICG, the displacement of peoples is also analysed. While the reports of the 
ICG eventually expose the historic roots of the current issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
past that explains Sudan’s current state of affairs remains unanswered. The historiographical 
and contextual sources complement the reports by the ICG in the case of Sudan. It is also 
important to underscore the dilemma faced by the international community regarding the central 
government of Khartoum. According to Nick Grono Sudan is especially problematic for the 
United States because the Sudanese government is an important intelligence provider in the war 
on terror. Sudan is also a member of the United Nations and China is an important economic 
investor and importer of oil which could possibly block intrusive measures from the 
international community.70 Therefore it is extremely difficult for the West to interfere or set up 
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peace missions in conflicts situations in Sudan, which will be exposed in my analysis of the 
reports of the ICG. 
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2. Context Bosnia and Herzegovina 
In this chapter I will outline the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is crucial to understand 
the ethnic grievances, political instability, wars and internal displacement of many civilians that 
has afflicted the country in both its recent past and in the present. Since the past of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is a very complex and often contested one, especially by Balkan historians, I have 
chosen to use the work of Non-Balkan authors that are deemed the most authoritative on this 
topic, namely Noel Malcolm, Cathie Carmichael and Sumantra Bose.71 Firstly, I will discuss 
the Dayton Peace Agreement that stopped the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The historic roots of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s current political situation has two 
reasons that are closely linked to each other. To stop the ongoing war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, a peace conference was set up on a military base near Dayton, Ohio in the United 
States in November 1995. The three most important parties involved in the conflict, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, gathered here to agree a peace 
treaty. This process was witnessed by several parties, like the United States, the European 
Union and by member states of the European Union. An agreement was reached at the end of 
November and it was signed on the 14th of December 1995 in Paris. The official name for the 
agreement is the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also 
named the Dayton Peace Agreement, Dayton Accords, or Dayton-Paris Agreement in short. 
With these accords, it was put to paper that all countries involved were to respect the 
sovereignty of their neighbours and that any remaining disputes should be resolved 
peacefully.72 The parties involved also agreed to respect and uphold human rights and the rights 
of refugees and IDPs, and that they should have the opportunity to move across the country 
freely and without any limits.73 The most important aspect, one that is still the root of many 
problematic issues faced by Bosnia and Herzegovina to this day is the splitting up of the country 
in two entities, namely the Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srpska).74 
This division established sharp ethnic divisions that existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina shortly 
after the civil war. However, there were ethnic tensions between the different groups that inhabit 
the country before the war in the nineties as well. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, three main ethnic 
groups can be distinguished: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. These divisions are foremost a 
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religious division of peoples in the Former Yugoslavia, and are actually a by-product of 
nationalism that overtook political thinking at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the 
twentieth century in the Balkans, because these divisions did not exist before that. Bosniaks are 
Muslim, while Serbs are Christian Orthodox and Croats are Catholic. It was only after the 
conquering of the Balkans by the Ottoman Empire in the middle of the fifteenth century that a 
large number of people in the country that we now call Bosnia and Herzegovina became 
Muslims. Before that, in medieval and early modern times, the peoples that lived within roughly 
the same borders as the current modern nation state were either Christian Orthodox, Roman 
Catholic or were members of the Bosnian Church and when there was war, this was solely on 
the basis of conquering territory in order for ruling royal families to have regional hegemony. 
Bosnia was an instable territory, because succession of the crown was not necessarily based on 
birth right. A claim to the crown could also be made in the region on the basis of a nobleman’s 
territorial superiority alone.75 This falsifies the myth that the conflict along ethnic lines like in 
the war on the Balkans in the nineties has an ancient historical base. People who lived within 
the borders of a territory called Bosnia and Herzegovina in history considered themselves 
residents of the country, no matter the religion they followed. Religious affiliation was thin with 
many people in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the middle ages. There were not so many priests 
because many parts of the country were very hard to access. The landscape and a lack of good 
infrastructure in the region meant that religious leaders were unable to keep hold of the 
followers of their beliefs as much as in other European regions.76 Many would have no hard 
time to accept Islam as their religion because of this. In the centuries that followed it would 
become the religion with the largest following base in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
It was only after nationalism overtook political thinking in Europe that ethnicity, 
combined with religion became important on the Balkans. During that time, approximately 
1850-1900, a major part of the region was under Austria-Hungary control. National identity 
was a way for the peoples of the Balkans to set themselves apart from the empire that controlled 
it. These national identities were set along ethnic and religious lines especially. These ideas also 
came in to the Bosnian territory through the neighbouring countries of Croatia and Serbia. The 
latter was an independent kingdom at this time. It was during this period that religion became 
a way to distinguish between different peoples in the Bosnian province of the Austria-Hungary 
empire, who before that only saw themselves as Bosnians, simply because of the name of the 
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geographical location. Now, however, because of their religious affiliation and the influence of 
political thinking in the neighbouring countries did groups of people think of themselves as 
Croatians or Serbians rather than Bosnians. During the First World War, the interwar period 
and the Second World War conflicting nationalist ways of thinking would be an important 
factor for conflict on the Balkans.77 
During the Communist era after the Second World War, when all nations in this 
discussion were united under the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, these ideas and the possible 
grievances and conflicts that could have developed because of it were contained. The three 
distinct ethnic groups lived in relative harmony with each other.78 Certain nationalist sentiments 
did however not die down in the new Socialist Republic, but they were contained within the 
private sphere of family and friends rather than publicly during the nineties and before the 
creation of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia.79 The communist republic consisted of six 
provinces of which Bosnia and Herzegovina was one and the people who lived there were 
considered a distinct nationality within Yugoslavia. This was not the case in the first few years. 
Similar to doctrine in the Soviet Union, religion was to be forbidden in the Socialist Republic 
of Yugoslavia. All possible religious symbols were forbidden on the streets. Churches, mosques 
and religious schools were demolished or these buildings were to have another purpose. 
Bosnian Muslims came in a peculiar position where they had to choose via a census if they 
either identified themselves as Muslim Croats or Muslim Serbs. Bosnia and Herzegovina would 
eventually assimilate with either country and the Bosnian national identity and nation would 
disappear.80 After 1948, Muslims had the chance to register themselves as ‘nationally 
undeclared’ and in 1953 as ‘Yugoslav, nationally undeclared’. An overwhelming majority of 
people of the Muslim faith registered as such.81 It would not take long before Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and thus Bosnian Muslims as an ethnic group within this entity, would be declared 
a nation within Yugoslavia. Religion would not have a difficult position as in the Soviet Union 
and believers would not be rated as second class citizens. Because Yugoslavia had to rely on 
other allies, they would soon let go their anti-religious stance.82  
After the fall of the communist republic the ethnic nationalism that came into being 
roughly a century earlier sprung into life again in the public sphere. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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declared itself independent of Yugoslavia after Slovenia and Croatia respectively. Bosniaks and 
Croats were in favour of independence, while Serbs were not. With the support of the Yugoslav 
army, Serbs political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina declared their own republic within the 
country and initiated a war in which Bosnian Serb forces conquered territory where Serb 
Orthodox groups lived in order to protect them and to expel non-Serbs from these territories. 
The goal was to ethnically cleanse these areas and have them ultimately join Serbia. Of course, 
now we know that during the war there was not only the expelling of ethno-religious 
communities other than the Serb Orthodox from certain territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
but also the mass murder of them. The biggest atrocity happened in and around the town of 
Srebrenica at the end of the war when 7000 Bosniak men and boys were murdered. The war 
was stopped and a conference was issued where all parties involved eventually came to a 
settlement. 
After this settlement ethnic divisions were now more exposed and defined in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina than ever before in history. In the Republika Srpska, Serb Orthodox people are the 
majority, while in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosniaks and Croats are the 
majority ethnic groups. It is because of this strict division that minority returns of IDPs are a 
problematic phenomenon in Bosnia and Herzegovina on grounds of discrimination, safety and 
the possibility of building a future. 
 
2.1 Context Sudan 
The current problems and grievances that the peoples of Sudan and South Sudan faced have 
their roots in the past, which will be discussed in this section. Before the area was colonized, it 
was governed by the Funj Sultanate of Sinnar between roughly 1500 to 1800, which was both 
an African divine kingship state and Islamic polity, according to O’ Fahey.83 During the first 
colonial period from 1820 to 1881, under Turko-Egyptian rule, various Arabic Sufi Islamic 
brotherhoods emerged in the region, linking the old holy families of the Funj Sultanate into 
supra-ethnic organisations, who would become very powerful entities in the colonial period of 
Sudan.84 All these organisations were centred in and around the old capital of Omdurman, 
which is now part of the new capital Khartoum. This new capital was established under British 
colonial rule.85 During the Turko-Egyptian rule, slave owning would be a common activity in 
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the north of Sudan.86 When the British took control of Sudan, forming an Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium from 1898 to 1956, they imported policies used in India. In personal matters or 
private matters, Muslims were allowed to apply Sharia law, while in criminal matters secular 
law applied. This was also the case under the Funj and Darfur Sultanates before colonization.87 
During the anti-colonial struggle, other Arabic supra-ethnic movements emerged like the 
Umma and Mahdiyya. With strength derived from Islamic sentiments and solidarity, the anti-
colonial position of these movements was only secular nationalist and not religious.88 They 
were also able to create a sense of national unity among different supra-ethnic movements, 
transcending the old tribal allegiances.89 These supra-ethnic nationalist movements already had 
strong positions in the British colonial system. This riverain northern elite, as they are now 
called, had educational opportunities and were involved in economic activities of the colonial 
powers. The south, which merged with Sudan shortly after the beginning of the twentieth 
century, was nothing more than a pragmatic buffer-zone that had to be Christianised by British 
missionaries in order to prevent the further Islamisation of Africa.90 There were kept 
underdeveloped under British colonial rule and thus became nothing more than a periphery 
region exploited for cheap labour, slaves and the cultivation of cotton.91  
After independence, the Western-educated riverain elite became the most powerful in 
Sudan and kept the old colonial system alive and even sharpened the centre-periphery 
contrast.92 At first, ethnic groups around the country were allowed to have their own regions 
within the overarching nation state of Sudan. However, shortly afterwards, the Western-
educated riverain elite in the capital Khartoum would try to force their Arab identity, which 
they deemed superior to other black, African, Christian, non-Arab identities on the whole 
country.93 Arabisation would become the main objective of the northern elite to promote an 
Arab national unity and identity.94 The subsequent postcolonial governments implemented this 
policy of assimilation on the south especially in order to undo the work of the British colonial 
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rule in the periphery.95 The south was deemed an obstacle to the spreading of Islam and should 
therefore be Islamised.96 As was the case during British rule, the dominant group, now the 
northern Arab Islamic elite of Khartoum, would prioritise itself politically, economically and 
culturally. The revenues of the most important economic activity of Sudan, first cotton, then 
sugar and now oil, would only be collected and invested by the capital.97 The periphery regions 
of the south and other regions were, similar to the colonial period, only to be exploited for their 
resources since they were culturally inferior according to the northern elite.98 Even Islamic 
groups were not ensured strong political and economic positions in Sudan if they were deemed 
black or African rather than Arab.99 These sharp racial and ethnic distinctions were passed on 
to the new dominant elite by the former British colonial elite. They were the ones who justified 
who ruled and who were ruled upon, who had full rights and who were subjects before the 
riverain elite.100 The new political elite in Khartoum would build on that old colonial principle 
instead of building an inclusive community in a multi-ethnic society like Sudan.101 The 
ideological stance of the riverain elite on these two exclusive sets of identities, Arab dominance 
on one hand and black African subservience on the other, and the economic marginalization of 
the periphery would trigger the conflicts that still continue to this day in both Sudan and South 
Sudan.102  
The first civil war in Sudan, from 1956 to 1971, was a mixture of grievances on the 
forceful implementation of the Arab Islamic identity over the whole country and the economic 
marginalization and history of slavery of the south. In other words, the civil war was both a 
struggle over identity and resources. The southern rebellion was a secessionist movement. 
Southern political leaders were, even though they had seats in the government of Khartoum, 
never involved in any political decision making process in order to keep the unity of Sudan 
intact. This meant that the Arab Islamic elite could uphold their ultimate goal of an Arab 
national identity and keep profits from resources for themselves.103 The number of southern 
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politicians was low anyway, since education and politics had historically always been in 
Khartoum.104 The south responded to the repression by the central government by keeping 
resources for themselves, which only lead to economic stagnation for the whole of Sudan and 
the further militarization and escalation of the conflict.105 Under Gafaar Muhammad al-Nimeiri, 
president of Sudan from 1969 to 1985, violence turned into negotiation. In 1972 the Addis 
Ababa peace accord was signed by Nimeiri on behalf of the central government of Sudan and 
by Joseph Lagu of the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) on behalf of the rebels.106 It 
ushered in a short period of peace where the north allowed the south to have its own local 
governments. However the riverain elite still privileged itself heavily over the south 
economically. When Sharia was applied to the whole of Sudan in September 1983, the country 
became even more polarized than before the peace accord of 1972.107  
The second civil war commenced shortly after the implementation of Sharia law in 
Sudan in 1983. Unlike the first conflict, this war was not a secessionist movement, but rather a 
battle for equality no matter the ethnic background or religion of rebels and their allies. The 
spiritual leader of this new movement was John Garang, who with the Sudan People Liberation 
Movement (SPLM) was able to unite different ethnic groups of the south for a common cause. 
He would also get support from other marginalized ethnic groups in the north, even if they were 
Islamic, but not Arab, like the Fur in the Darfur region.108 The essence was to keep Sudan with 
the colonial borders, but free from the tyranny and discrimination of the northern Arab elite.109 
In other words, Garang changed the scope of the conflict in Sudan from a North-South divide 
to a centre-periphery divide.110 Under this new basis the Nuba, Beja, Funj and Fur peoples, all 
in the administrative north of Sudan, would join the cause of the SPLM. The response from the 
central government of Khartoum was more violence, even resulting in the so called scorched 
earth tactics mentioned earlier.111 Likewise, violence was also the response by the rebellion to 
the actions of the central government. In Sudan, a vicious cycle of conflict has existed ever 
since its independence. Instead of listening to the grievances of periphery regions, the riverain 
elite supressed these voices hard-handed, making civilians more radical and willing to take up 
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arms against their oppressors too.112 Animosity and mistrust against the Arab elite of Khartoum 
is widespread and insurmountable across the periphery.113 
With the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, a long period of 
conflict between the central government and the southern rebel forces came to a hold. Within 
the framework of the accord it was decided that the south would have the possibility to secede 
from the North in 2011.114 As we now know, this arrangement in the agreement has been 
deployed via a referendum in which the overwhelming majority of the southern population 
voted yes to secession from the north. The reasons for this are multiple. First, the peace accord 
was only a façade to the outside world. Promises on a more fairly distributed economy and 
assurances on southern politicians being more involved in the political process in Khartoum 
were not respected by the riverain elite. The promises of a better infrastructure in the south and 
a sustainable solution to IDPs from the south in the north were not respected either.115 The fact 
that southern politicians of the SPLM still had little to no power in the political process was 
most visible in their inability to stop the conflict that was still raging in Darfur, even before the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.116 In Darfur, atrocities happened even during 
peace talks. The scorched earth tactics, as described earlier, were also implemented in this 
western region of Sudan against the nomadic and pastoralist non-Arabic Islamic peoples living 
there. The central government sought support from Arab militias in the region. In this case of 
Darfur the Janjaweed were set up against the non-Arabic tribes of the region.117 In the light of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, however, the ongoing conflict in Darfur was not 
important enough at the time to intervene. A sustainable solution to the North-South grievances 
was deemed essential.118 
With the secession of the south from the north a new country was formed: South Sudan. 
For the northern riverain elite this was deemed as collateral damage in order to finally stop the 
war between the two regions.119 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement had peace between the 
two entities well regulated, but it did not mean a general end to conflicts in both countries. Were 
one conflict ended, new conflicts emerged in the new situation. Within the new landscape of 
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two countries the grievances of rebel groups in Sudan that were affiliated with the SPLM before 
secession of the south remained unresolved. The Arab riverain elite of the north persisted in 
their old ways of using force in order to culturally homogenize periphery regions, even after 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.120 Meanwhile, the new South Sudan would make the 
same mistakes as their old northern political enemies. The country would become highly 
centralized around the capital Juba, creating the similar centre-periphery divide as in the old 
Sudan with the same grievances and accusations of marginalized ethnic groups against the 
dominant Dinka and Nuer groups.121 Ethnic grievances were not new in the south. They were, 
however, lulled by the civil wars due to the oppression of the riverain elite of the south after 
colonial independence, giving various ethnic groups in the south a common cause.122 After the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement and secession of South Sudan, the people of the new nation 
were still heavily armed and ethnic groups eventually relapsed into conflicts over tensions from 
before the civil war. Violence was again, as was the case in the wars before the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement, seen as the only way to solve ethnic tensions and discontent with the political 
and economic situation of the new South Sudan.123 Security was in other words not guaranteed 
in the new nation and people who committed violence were usually not prosecuted, making 
many civilians suspicious of their government.124 Despite their shared history of conflict against 
an oppressive elite and the fight for a multi-ethnic and multi-religious national identity, ethnic 
groups and political leaders in South Sudan were unable to promote and institutionalize a new 
national identity of diversity.125  
With this chapter I set out the historical context of both Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Sudan, leading to their present form. In the following chapter, using the reports of the ICG in 
my analysis, it will become clear that this context is important, because it can explain how both 
nation states are difficult to govern today. Especially for Sudan this is crucial, because its 
colonial history is missed by the ICG, which is crucial to understand its recent history and 
current state of affairs. 
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3. The ICG Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
In this analytical chapter I will show that after decades of advice by the ICG to the international 
community and local politicians and governments on affairs in both Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Sudan the issues still exist to this day. The ICG are an advisory organisation and rely on 
local governments, politicians and the international community to implement their ideas. My 
analysis of the reports by the ICG on affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan show that 
all parties are reluctant or unwilling to follow up the advices of the ICG. The organisation 
reveals the main reason for Bosnia and Herzegovina in their reports, while for Sudan they 
remain unexposed. Their reports on Sudan will be complemented with sources used in the 
historiography and context in order to understand the issues faced to this day. 
The first report by the ICG that specifically discussed the return of minorities was 
published in 1996. To enable the Bosniak IDPs to return, this report by the ICG showed that it 
was also important to give Serbs from Serbia and Croatia registered as refugees in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina a chance to return.126 Ethnic Serbs occupied many homes of IDPs in Republika 
Srpska at the time, which made it difficult for Bosniaks to return. The ICG stressed that the 
return of minorities was crucial for Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to have it become the 
multi-ethnic society it was before the war in accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement. In 
order to facilitate this process, the role of the international community was crucial. With the 
concept of international community, organisations like the UN and EU and important nation 
states within those organisations are meant. They should take a leading role in giving local 
governments in Bosnia and Herzegovina incentives to have minorities return via financial aid 
in order to rebuilt destroyed homes, the local economy and infrastructure. In order to have 
peoples of various ethnic backgrounds live together in peace without discrimination or violence, 
the UN Police Task Force and the Implementation Force (IFOR) should play a major role in 
protecting peace and the property of minority returnees.127 Shortly after the civil war, the return 
of IDPs was very slow and poorly regulated. In the first two years after the war regulation for 
housing of IDPs was not realised. The ICG underlined the nationalistic political atmosphere in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as the key reason and would do so in later reports as well. The politics 
nationalism and segregation that started the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the first place 
still was at the core of many institutions of the country. Because of these developments, many 
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IDPs of all ethnic backgrounds chose to either stay in a region where they were part of the 
majority ethnic group in fear of discrimination if they moved back to their homes.128 Refugees 
returning to the country also returned to places where they became part of the majority ethnic 
group, making them IDPs in the process as well. Despite the willingness of the international 
community to help IDPs to return via the arrangement of free bus travels and giving financial 
aid to local governments willing to take back their original residents, people were reluctant to 
move because they feared discrimination from the majority group in a region or city because of 
their ethnic religious background.129 This mistrust and suspicion created by the civil war had 
not disappeared. Besides that, it was not clear at the time what local governments did with the 
money they received from the international community. There was the possibility of corruption 
and abuse of power and financial aid. Therefore the ICG recommended the international 
community and organisations overseeing the process of rebuilding Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
supervise the process of IDP return in the country more closely. Local governments that 
obstructed minority returns through the destruction of houses destined for minorities should be 
punished. Besides that, and this is one of the important aspects of the IDP problem in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and their return as minorities to their former homes to this day, the nationalist 
politics that ruled political thinking and the media even after the civil war had to change as well 
for the process of IDP return to be successful. Discrimination against minorities in everyday 
life and on the job market was the rule rather than the exception.130 
 Despite the fear of many people to return to their former homes to escape discrimination 
on all levels of society, there were places in Bosnia and Herzegovina where a significant number 
of IDPs returned to shortly after the war. Two years after the war ended, the ICG reported that 
places like Sarajevo, Jajce and Travnik saw large groups of minorities return to their cities. 
These places always were more diverse and accepting off ethnic minorities historically. 
Therefore many minority IDPs returned to these places. According to the ICG this was a hopeful 
development that maybe could lead to a domino effect around the country. However, despite 
this history of multi-ethnicity, these cities formulated discriminatory laws on housing. Homes 
were mostly handed to people from majority groups in the cities mentioned before. In turn more 
people became IDPs because they came to live in a city they did not originate from. Those 
minorities that did have the chance to return, faced discrimination on all levels in society. They 
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had trouble finding work and had little to no contact with other ethnic groups.131 In the cities of 
Jajce and Travnik there even was violence against returned minorities, sparked in the media by 
nationalist local leaders and their rhetoric of segregation and ethnic cleansing. Unlike the 
articles in the historiography, this report from the ICG explicitly mentioned how discrimination 
and segregation was not a grassroots problem alone. Politicians heavily influenced the people 
they governed and their hateful language was shown in the media as well, which in some cases 
even led to violence against minority groups by ordinary people of other ethnic groups. Despite 
the larger number of minorities returning to Sarajevo, Jajce and Travnik, segregation was still 
at the core of everyday life in society.132 
 The three cities mentioned before were exceptions because of a significant number of 
IDPs returning. However, even in those cities, like elsewhere in the country, the ICG 
acknowledged that ethnic segregation and discrimination was the rule in politics, the media and 
everyday life. The most important element of the Dayton Peace Agreement was to again create 
a multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina equal to the country it was before the civil war. In order 
to realise this, the ICG argued from the first report mentioned in this chapter that it was essential 
to have people return to their former homes if they were a minority in their places of origin. 
Unfortunately, the same Dayton Peace Agreement has made it nearly impossible to have a 
diverse society, something the articles used in the historiography failed to acknowledge, but the 
ICG does. With the setting up of the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the 
agreement, two separate entities were created within the overarching nation state. The 
Federation is predominately inhabited by Bosniaks and Croats, while Serbian Republic, or the 
Republika Srpska, is mostly inhabited by Serbs. With the realisation of the two sharply defined 
ethnic states within an overarching nation state, The ICG argued that both the international 
community and the three parties from the Balkans that signed the deal anchored the very reasons 
the civil war was started in a legal framework. It made it nearly impossible for minorities to 
return home.133 The two entities were so strict that it became possible for politicians to uphold 
their nationalist politics as before and during the war. With this analysis, the ICG laid bare that 
discrimination and segregation of ethnic minority groups existed on the grassroots level because 
the Dayton Peace Agreement upheld a nationalist political atmosphere. The ethnic cleansing 
and genocide during the war in Republika Sprska was now legally fixed and discrimination and 
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segregation of minorities still happened because of this. Many IDPs therefore chose not to 
return fearing they would be killed. Unfortunately, the grievances between the different groups 
shortly after the war meant that IDPs in general were reluctant to move back to their homes and 
rather stayed put in a majority area. Even emotional, nostalgic reasons was not an incentive for 
people to return to their homes.134 There seemed to be the risk that the country would forever 
have predominately segregated Bosniak, Croat and Serb communities. The hope for a multi-
ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina that was outlined in the first report by the ICG a few years 
earlier was already replaced by pessimism two years later. 
 As time passed by, not only discriminatory reasons were the mainspring of politicians 
in their localities to avert IDPs from returning to their homes. In a report that discussed the legal 
framework on the prevention of minority returns in localities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
published in 1999, the ICG showed that many houses were now occupied by other residents. 
Local governments were not keen to force these people to move for the pre-war owners.135 
There were some localities that tried their best to make it easier for IDPs to return because of 
pressure from the international community. Sarajevo’s local government was one that tried to 
fill the gap of inclusiveness and diversity that Bosnia and Herzegovina was lacking after the 
war. However, even with the pressure of the international community to change for the better, 
politicians were reluctant as ever to really make fruitful changes in their legislation and provide 
minorities with housing, jobs and education. When minorities returned, they were mostly 
elderly people, who did not face discrimination as much as younger people who were still on 
the job and educational market.136 If people returned as IDPs or refugees in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, everywhere in the country they were only favoured if they were part of the 
majority group in that region or city. Ethnic groups lived next to each other without any dialogue 
and the possibility of reconciliation. Suspicion and mistrust stayed at the forefront of everyday 
life. The ICG argued that the reason the capital Sarajevo was also reluctant to create a climate 
in which minorities should not fear to return to their former homes is also due to the fact that 
other localities and entities in the country, like the Republika Sprska, did not respond to 
Sarajevo’s initiative and did not show any willingness to change legislations for minority 
returns there.  
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 At the turn of the century, however, the ICG reported on improvements and pessimism 
was shortly replaced by hope again. The number of IDPs returning to their former homes grew 
significantly. This was however not happening because of investments by the international 
community or local governments. Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in internal displacement all grew 
tired of the impotence of both the international caregivers and local politicians to come with 
sustainable solutions and a significant number of them returned to their former cities and 
towns.137 According to the ICG, this did not mean that the international community should keep 
their hands off this new development. They should give economic assistance and take security 
measures to make sure that this trend would become the rule instead of the exception in the 
future. The local governments should in turn guarantee minority returnees a sustainable return 
and offer good housing, work and/or education.138 In a report published in 2002, the ICG 
showed that 900,000 people, either refugees or IDPs, had returned to their homes in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.139 This did however not mean that segregation and nationalist politics had 
vanished from the scene, according to the ICG. On the contrary, even seven years after the civil 
war ended, the ICG showed that there were still many people registered as IDPs, mainly because 
refugees who had returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina returned to areas where their ethnic 
group was the majority. Legislation concerning the housing of minorities was also still not 
regulated properly in many parts of the country.140  
The ICG reported their main argument for the remaining instability, lack of a significant 
number of minority returns and growing segregation a year earlier. The biggest reason for the 
remaining political, economic and political instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina lies in the 
arranging of two entities within the overarching nation state solution and the creation of 
Republika Srpska. With this argument, the ICG acknowledged the crucial factor to understand 
the problems of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, they were undeniably six years too late 
with this insight. Since the end civil war the Dayton Peace Agreement created sharply defined 
ethnic entities within the overarching nation state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. With the 
recognition of Republika Srpska, a region was legalized that obtained its existence through 
ethnic cleansing and genocide and their willingness to eventually join neighbouring country 
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Serbia.141 In all the actions of the elite and politicians of this entity it was clear they tried to 
prevent a united, well-functioning nation state to come into existence in all possible ways and 
have minorities return to their entity. They also denied the historic roots and the people of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as something that did not have the right to exist in the first place. On 
all fronts the voices of nationalism and segregation rule the politics of Republika Sprksa. 
Politicians in the Federation were also not willing to create a better atmosphere for minority 
IDPs to return to their entity because of this political climate. According to a report by the ICG 
on Republika Srpska, published in 2001, the political elite of this entity controlled the media, 
police and courts. Minorities were discriminated against and segregated as if they did not have 
a place in the region. Violence against minorities was more common than elsewhere in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.142 The political elite did everything in its power to block mandates, laws and 
legislations set up by the central government that could help Bosnia and Herzegovina make 
significant progress after the war and have minorities return. In other words, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was still in a cycle of unwillingness on all sides to co-operate and change for the 
better, because the other group was reluctant to do so. The ICG already acknowledged that 
changes had to occur in the same report published in 2001. It made the bold statement that the 
best solution was the dismantling of the two entities and create one centralised nation state, but 
knew that this was not a desirable solution anymore, because it could mean another civil war. 
Therefore, the international community should advocate for more modest political thinking and 
either punish Republika Srpska whenever possible if no changes occurred or reward them if 
those changes happened.143 However, as long as the constitutional maze of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina with its three entities consisting of the central government, the Federation and the 
Serb Republic exists, the ICG argued that the country remains unmanageable and the issues for 
IDPs remain unresolved. With their last report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, published in 2014, 
the ICG showed that even almost twenty years after the war the same issues that were outlined 
in this chapter still exist.144  
 Even though the ICG has given good policy advices to both local governments and local 
communities to solve the IDP problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the same problems still exist 
two decades after the war. Even though the ICG is still located in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
still analyses the situation in the country and gives policy advice to local governments and the 
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international community, there is still not a sustainable solution to the problems the country has 
faced since the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. In the end the ICG is only an 
advisory organisation without the mandate to push for change and their work has not led to 
changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even though the ICG would recommend and set up 
meetings between groups to avert the crisis and push for change more directly in Sudan, the 
following section will show that the same can be concluded for that country as for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
 
3.1 The ICG Mission in Sudan 
In this section via the reports of the ICG and the work of Jok Madut Jok and Richard Cockett I 
show the unwillingness of the elite in Khartoum to change their ways and revert to violence 
against both rebels and civilians in this section. This persistence of using violence by the 
government in turn makes rebels and civilians mistrust the central government even more and 
see conflict as the only way to push for their demands. Despite numerous policy 
recommendations to the government and opposition forces by the ICG and its urging toward 
the international community to monitor proceedings in the country, very little to nothing has 
changed over time.  
 The first report by the ICG on Sudan was published in 2002, during a time when the 
peace process for the eventual Comprehensive Peace Agreement was just underway. The ICG 
showed that even during peace talks, the government of Khartoum used violence against 
innocent civilians, as they had done many times during the civil war. Innocent civilians, mostly 
displaced women and children, were attacked by a combat helicopter in Bieh, a province in the 
south of Sudan, while waiting in line at a food supply truck.145 This was only the first example 
of actions the government used against civilians in their history and in the future. There has 
been a seemingly endless resort to violence as a means to stay in power and push for economic 
and cultural hegemony during any given circumstance. The peace negotiations mentioned here 
were of course part of the peace-making process between the northern elite of Khartoum and 
the marginalised south of Sudan. However, if conflict was to be ended in the whole of the 
country, the ICG emphasised that both the central government, the southern rebellion in Sudan 
and the international community should start peace processes for other marginalised regions as 
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well. Not the old North-South, but the centre-periphery antithesis would give the whole of 
Sudan sustainable peace.146 The centre-periphery approach to the conflicts in Sudan is of course 
similar to the vision of Jok Madut Jok. With this analysis of the situation in Sudan, the ICG 
acknowledged its political situation of an elite government in the capital marginalising the rest 
of the country. The ICG reported in 2003 on the peoples of the periphery border states of Abyei, 
Nuba and the Southern Blue Nile. These peoples are in the administrative north of Sudan 
bordering the south, but were fighting with the SPLM against government forces because of 
their marginalisation.147 A North-South peace accord alone would not solve the grievances of 
these regions. Without sustainable solutions for these border states, both the rebels and the 
northern elite of Khartoum would resort to violence to push their agendas.148 The ICG were 
right in their analysis of this situation as later reports will show. Jok Madut Jok has well 
documented the problems of the peoples of the Nuba mountains especially, whose civilians 
were forced to displace in great numbers to camps controlled by the government for decades. 
Not only did these people lose their traditional ways of earning a living, they were also in danger 
of losing their culture because of the Arab Islamic agenda of the central government in 
Khartoum.149 In the same period that the ICG began their advisory work in Sudan and a peace 
process between the northern elite and the south was underway, the war in Darfur broke out as 
well. The ICG showed in a report published in 2004 how the international community, namely 
organisations like the United Nations, the African Union and important investors in the country 
like a number of countries from the Arab world, Russia and China were unable to observe 
events in the western region of Sudan and put real pressure on the central government to change 
proceedings.150 The ICG was under the impression that Khartoum exploited the international 
community’s rhetorical pressure and threats on stopping the ongoing conflict in Darfur and did 
not change their policies.151 Besides that, the conflict in Darfur was not really relevant to the 
international community yet in the light of the peace process that would lead to the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.152 The fact that the government of Khartoum was an 
important intelligence provider on Islamic terrorism for the United States at the time and 
China’s power to block intervening measures by the UN as an important investor in and 
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importer of oil from Sudan the conflict in Darfur would escalate over the following years. 
Because of this reluctance to put pressure on the central government regarding Darfur by the 
international community many civilians would be displaced and killed by Arab militias in the 
region, who were hired by the elite of Khartoum to implement their scorched earth tactics.153 
 In 2005, the year the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, the ICG also set out 
a new plan via a report in order to live up to a sustainable peace for all marginalised regions of 
Sudan.154 The ICG again acknowledged the lack of vigour of the international community to 
find solutions for the whole country. Even after the closing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in January 2005, war and the killing of innocent civilians still happened in Darfur, 
while the international observers reckoned that with the closing of the peace accord this conflict 
would also come to a close.155 After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, it 
became the task of the international community to protect civilians displaced and under attack 
in Darfur and start new peace processes regarding the western region of Sudan and other 
marginalised regions in the northern administrative part the country.156 With this stance, the 
ICG seem to understand that the grievances of each marginalised region should be understood 
on its own rather than in a national frame. However, a year after signing the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement, the ICG reported in 2006 that not much had changed in the relations between 
the Khartoum elite and the SPLM in the south. The National Congress Party (NCP), the largest 
political party in the capital, was still sovereign compared to its weak and divided SPLM, 
especially after the death of its leader John Garang during the summer of 2005.157 There was 
no clear partnership between the two political entities, as was arranged in the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement and the NCP was cunning in their exploitation of loopholes in the accord to 
keep their position of absolute power in the country.158 For example, the northern elite was very 
secretive about oil revenues, which would be divided 50/50 after the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement between Khartoum and the SPLM. Minister posts would be divided between 
members of the NCP and the SPLM as well after the agreement, but this had not happened yet 
either. Finally, a sustainable long term solution would be agreed, but returns were very few and 
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badly arranged still.159 Meanwhile, the conflict in Darfur escalated and the international 
community remained unable to force an end to proceedings and provide guarantees to civilians, 
rebels and other warring parties.160  
Two years after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, it was clear for the ICG that this 
agreement alone had not solved all the problems and conflicts in Sudan. The ICG argued in a 
report in 2007 that the lack of peace talks on the Darfur war during the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement discussions had escalated the conflict beyond proportions.161 A mistake by the 
international community which was unable to understand the true reasons for conflict in Sudan. 
As both the ICG and Jok discussed, the best frame to understand Sudan’s conflicts is not a 
North-South but a centre-periphery divide.162 Therefore, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
between the northern elite of Khartoum and the SPLM of the south was not sufficient for peace 
in all marginalised regions of Sudan. The agreement was not or only partly complied in the first 
place as mentioned before. It would mean the change from a closed to an open democracy, 
wherein the NCP could lose its power.163 The ICG also acknowledged the inaction of the 
international community because of conflicting views between the West, China, Russia and the 
Arab World.164 Meanwhile it was becoming clear that in the far north of Sudan people were 
displaced in great numbers too. A large number of people from the Nubia ethnic group, a Non-
Arab Islamic group living along the Nile, were being forced of their land by the elite of 
Khartoum because of the construction of a dam. The Nubia reaped no financial benefits because 
of their cultural background, identical to other marginalised groups around Sudan.165 One of 
many examples of economic and cultural marginalisation of peoples living in the periphery 
brought forward by the ICG to this point.  
There were not only problems of implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement by the NCP. In 2008, the ICG also reported on a clear disunity within the SPLM 
which was not helping in achieving a functioning peace accord between the north and the south 
either. The SPLM was divided over either striving for independence or continuing Garang’s 
vision of a united Sudan free of discrimination for all marginalised peoples.166 Distrust between 
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the elite of Khartoum and the SPLM also remained high because of the lack of implementation 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.167 Meanwhile, the ICG still endorsed the fact that the 
international community was wrong in not treating every problem and conflict in Sudan equally, 
because they were all showing the same symptoms and grievances by rebel and marginalised 
groups.168 Again, the ICG showed a clear understanding of Sudan’s situation with this 
statement. The main focus of the UN and other international organisations was still on Darfur, 
while the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the conflicts in the 
border regions of Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Kordofan should also get equal attention in order 
to have widespread peace in Sudan according to the ICG.169 Peace is, however, hard to achieve 
when both the ruling NCP, rebels, opposition parties and the international community keep 
falling back into the same tactics, conflict, violence and neglect of the implementation of 
accords. Similar to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the moving forward of the same issues 
year after year quickly led to pessimism on the situation of Sudan. 
In 2009, the ICG reported on some hopeful developments. The Darfur and East Sudan 
Peace Accord were signed in the same year, but respect and implementation of these deals was 
again inadequate, as was the case with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was signed 
four years earlier.170 The ICG again insisted that the international community should do more 
and observe proceedings on the implementation of peace accords in Sudan. The worst case 
scenario could be that periphery regions might want to secede or turn to all-out war with the 
government forces and Arab militias supported by Khartoum once again.171 For the first time 
since reporting on the civil war in Sudan, the ICG acknowledged that national unity might be 
at risk because of distrust and the lack of implementation of peace accords and the failure of 
democratic reform by the NCP who kept all political power to themselves, leading only to more 
violence and displacement of civilians.172 It would not be long before the SPLM would set up 
the referendum on independence of the south. Because of distrust towards the government in 
Khartoum, their lack of implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in terms of 
political power and welfare sharing and the international community only giving attention to 
troubles in Darfur, the south saw it as the only viable option.173 
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After decades of only thinking in terms of violence, it is hard lose this way of thinking. 
Even before the referendum on secession of the south, the ICG reported on ethnic violence in 
the province of Jonglei in the far south of Sudan. With the old North-South divide not as 
important anymore and a still heavily armed population because of the civil war from the 
eighties until the closing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement old grievances between ethnic 
groups in the south flared up again. These conflicts mostly were on access to pastoral grounds 
and the presumed state bias of one ethnic group over another by the SPLM, similar to their 
political rivals in Khartoum.174 Even though peace was indeed respected between Sudan and 
South Sudan during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, because there was no all-out civil 
war anymore after signing it, the ICG reported in 2009 that the accord had not solved the 
internal problems in both countries.175 In other words, local solutions would bring peace before 
national solutions. As shown before, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement did not stop conflict 
in periphery regions in the north and the international community and the SPLM in the south 
could not prevent it either. They felt they had more important issues to take on within their own 
region, like keeping national unity and implementing a better infrastructure, education system 
and welfare sharing in the country.176 However, even before and after secession, South Sudan 
was also falling into old ethnic conflicts from before the wars with Khartoum and some ethnic 
groups felt marginalised compared to others. The ICG reported in 2011, the year of the 
referendum on independence of the south that only the removal of the presumptions of one 
group favouring themselves over others by equally sharing governmental posts, welfare and 
resources by the SPLM would stop war in South Sudan.177 
Parties in South Sudan would however fail to make any improvements. Only two years 
after independence, the ICG reported on the outbreak of civil war in South Sudan.178 Despite 
the goodwill of the international community, who did not pay much attention to the build-up 
process of South Sudan after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and the financial resources 
the political leaders of the south were unable to prevent conflict between old allies. Instead, old 
ethnic grievances again came at the forefront now that the old common enemy in Khartoum 
was no longer a direct threat. Similar to Sudan and Khartoum, Juba was now the elite centre of 
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South Sudan and a centre-periphery divide became a reality, similar to Sudan before secession 
of the south.179 Jonglei, a province of South Sudan, would be seen as the blueprint of the issues 
that South Sudan has faced after secession. It is inhabited by numerous ethnic groups like the 
Dinka, Nuer, Murle, Jiye and Anuak, whom can also subdivided into more distinctive groups 
as well.180 All these groups were still armed because of the civil war before the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement and the political and justice system in the region was too weak to stop 
violence. The result was instability, fragmentation along ethnic lines and thinking in local 
instead of national solutions.181 When peace was discussed, only the ruling party (SPLM) and 
biggest opposition party (SPLM in opposition) sat around the table, leaving out other rebel 
factions and civilian movements in the process.182 As was the case in their history, many people 
felt that their only weapon against political injustice and marginalisation was violence, since 
they were not heard in the political sphere.183 The reaction of the ruling political actors was 
again violence. They even resorted to using the same tactics as their old rivals in Khartoum. 
Many innocent civilians were explicitly targeted in South Sudan. Their villages were destroyed 
and the peoples were either killed or displaced to government controlled camps only because 
of their ethnic background, making them a potential enemy or supporter of rebels.184 According 
to the ICG, violence could be stopped by giving religious and traditional leaders more influence 
in political processes, since history has proven that these people still had great influence on the 
ethnic groups they were part of. The ICG did not think that outsiders could have much influence 
in these processes, though they should ensure that the right people got more influence in the 
political process of South Sudan.185 
The government in Khartoum saw secession of the south only as collateral damage to 
prevent more war between the two entities.186 That did however not stop or prevent other 
conflicts in the country. Instead, the ICG published four reports on the resurfacing of old 
conflicts in many periphery regions, particularly in the border regions with the new South 
Sudan. Even Arab tribes that were allies for the implementation of the scorched earth tactics 
turned against the government of Khartoum because they felt marginalised. The Missirya, one 
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of those Arab groups, were unhappy with the abolition of the province of West Kordofan, in 
which they were the majority ethnic group, and started supporting the SPLM North in Sudan. 
The same applied to the Hawazma tribe.187 The central government now even resorted to 
violence against their old Arab allies. Again, they used the scorched earth tactics against 
innocent civilians who were arbitrarily suspect of being a rebel or supporting the rebels if they 
were part of a certain ethnic group, displacing more than 436,000 people in the process. Only 
now the elite in Khartoum had not won Arab tribes for their cause. Instead they used bombers 
against rebels and civilians.188 Again the ICG show the core of the issue in Sudan: an elite in 
Khartoum unwilling to change their ways, using violence against anyone who might be a threat 
to their power, only leading to more resentment and distrust among marginalised peoples. Since 
the SPLM and the south were seceded, rebels were forced to find allies elsewhere in order to 
find a common nationwide solution. Rebels in the northern border states found allies in the 
Sudan Revolutionary Force (SRF) in Darfur.189 With this action, both regions showed their 
willingness to look for broader political solutions for all marginalised groups instead of 
agreeing on local solutions only, which rarely led to peace as shown before. Local solutions 
would only lead to more ethnic groups wanting to secede from Sudan, leading to a domino-
effect, according to the ICG.190  
In the Blue Nile State more than 150,000 people were forced to flee to South Sudan and 
more than 200,000 people were displaced with the same tactics as in the Kordofan region. The 
situation in Blue Nile was even more dire. The ICG reported how civilians fled into forests and 
had no food or shelter and were still bombed if they were in plain sight of bombers.191 This 
border region also relapsed into violence as their only means to solve their grievances, because 
they felt abandoned and unnoticed after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and secession of 
the south and were attacked again by the central goverment.192 Blue Nile is characterized by a 
mix of Arab and non-Arab ethnic groups and the elite of Khartoum used this to their advantage 
in the new conflict in the region. Here, as in the Kordofan region, the SPLM North and the SRF 
strived for a national solution to marginalisation in periphery regions.193 However, many ethnic 
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groups, both rebels and civilians outside the SPLM, wanted local solutions. Again the ICG 
acknowledged the willingness of rebel groups to find local solutions rather than national 
solutions, but do not elaborate on this wish. The ICG also reported that marginalised groups 
and smaller rebel groups and civilian movements voices were unheard in the political process, 
which could only lead to more inter-ethnic conflict.194  
In a report on the eastern part of Sudan, bordering Ethiopia, the ICG showed how the 
lack of implementation of the Eastern Sudan Peace Accord was similar to that of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement before secession of South Sudan.195 The central government 
only kept extracting resources without welfare sharing.196 The Beja ethnic group, the largest in 
the region, felt abandoned by the SPLM after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, leading to 
a split in both supporters and opponents of the Eastern Sudan Peace Accord.197 According to 
Jok, some were or have even been prepared to adopt Arab culture to hopefully reap more 
benefits of the accord, something that was missed by the ICG in their analyses. Others remained 
resilient in their quest for equality or autonomy through violent measures.198 In Darfur all rebel 
parties kept their violent ways intact. In 2014, the ICG reported that even the Arab militias 
armed by the government were fighting against each other and government forces. Meanwhile 
the central government itself was in an economic crisis, making it less powerful and unable to 
disarm the militias it armed itself.199 Many people were still in IDP camps because of the 
continuous fighting and more people became displaced because of it. Many of these civilians 
were in acute need of aid.200 Similar to other discussed marginalised regions, the many different 
rebel and civilian voices meant that possible solutions were formed on the local rather than the 
national level.201 Again the ICG stressed that it was crucial for all parties involved that a 
sustainable peace in Sudan can only be achieved through national dialogue and finding national 
rather than local solutions. All marginalised regions should unite according to the ICG and the 
international community had an important role to play in this.202 
With the call for a national dialogue, the ICG go a step further than just the advisory 
role in Bosnia and Herzegovina in organising a meeting of the parties involved in the conflict 
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in Sudan to find sustainable solutions. However, with this call for a national dialogue the ICG 
show a lack of true understanding of the history of the country. Ever since independence from 
British rule in 1956, the country has almost uninterruptedly been in a civil war over the elite in 
Khartoum that marginalised the rest of the country. Despite several peace accords over more 
recent times, both the central government and rebel troops in the periphery regions remain 
assiduous in their use of violence to push through their agenda for a local solution and more 
autonomy. Peaceful protests by marginalised ethnic groups for more equality were seen as 
racism and undermining the government’s authority and were countered by violent measures 
by government forces and further marginalisation of the peripheries. Ethnic groups were set 
aside as inferior as well as rebels or rebel supporters for their identity in order for the elite to 
justify attacking them. SPLM rebel forces in turn justified conflict because of this, also leading 
to more people joining their cause as well.203 The result has been a vicious cycle of conflicts 
throughout the country. Generation after generation the people of Sudan grow up and live in a 
state of constant violence and grievances between different ethnic groups locally and an Arab 
elite far away in the capital Khartoum.204 Their contact with this elite has only been violent, 
making the chance of trust between groups and hope in peaceful coexistence extremely 
limited.205 Chances are even further limited because financial resources are mostly used for 
military purposes by both the central government and the SPLM, further militarising an already 
heavily weaponised state.206 Both the government in Khartoum and the SPLM forces in South 
Sudan are also impotent to disarm rebel factions or militias they once supported.207 
Despite the undesirability of a national dialogue because of the unbridgeable mistrust of 
periphery regions toward central government, the call for it by the ICG was eventually respected 
and national peace processes were started by the central government. Pessimism was again 
shortly replaced by hope for a better future. The promise of national dialogue was made by the 
Khartoum elite in 2015 according to the ICG. However, shortly afterwards it was again clear 
that they had no political will to change because of upcoming national elections and fear over 
losing their power.208 Meanwhile the opposition in the peripheries remained divided. The 
biggest opposition parties, the SPLM North and the SRF were reluctant to start a dialogue with 
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the elite because of their mistrust with them and boycotted talks and elections, which the 
riverain elite used to their advantage. It resulted in the government of Khartoum to express their 
will for dialogue while further expanding their power.209 The ICG again saw an important role 
for the international community, especially neighbouring countries, the Arab World and China 
as the most important investor, to guarantee the setting up of a national dialogue where all 
parties would be involved. The ICG also thought that the international community should have 
an important role in uniting the opposition parties into having a common goal so that they have 
a stronger position at the negotiation table.210 In 2016 the ICG published a report in which they 
discussed that national dialogues had indeed taken place since then, but they were meaningless, 
because marginalised groups from the periphery were neutralised by the Khartoum elite due to 
further centralisation of power.211 
After more than fourteen years of writing reports on the situation in Sudan and later in 
South Sudan as well by the ICG, it is clear that during that period many issues keep coming 
back. Despite the willingness of the ICG to help conduct policy changes in Sudan, local groups 
and politicians are unwilling to let go of their old ways. Different to the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, where the ICG acknowledged that the Dayton agreement has left the country in 
an inoperable state, the reason this was the case in Sudan remained unanswered by the same 
organisation. Jok’s book on Sudan has a different approach to the country than the ICG because 
it implemented the country’s history in its analysis. Without his insights, the reports of the ICG 
simply give an uncomplete picture to describe the current state of Sudan. According to Jok, the 
reason the country is not functioning are mostly missed by the West. Those reasons are missed 
by the ICG as well, which is a Western organisation. This is why the analysis of Jok Madut Jok, 
a Sudanese born, of the situation of Sudan is crucial in this thesis, because both the international 
community and the ICG hold on to a solitary state, while history has shown it has been 
inoperable. Even before independence in 1956, the foundations for Sudan’s current state of 
affairs would be set.  
The country has faced two colonial periods in its history. During those two periods, a 
land of more than a hundred ethnic groups would be moulded in one colonial state. After 
independence, one could say that the educated and influential Arab riverain elite took over the 
system that the old colonial rulers left behind. The difference was that they would be more 
radical than their predecessors. As Jok described in his book, the riverain elite would be a 
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government of giving little to nothing and taking almost everything from periphery regions in 
Sudan, all under the assertion that with their Arab identity they were superior to other Black 
African ethnic groups, no matter their religion. The elite of Khartoum also commenced their 
project of homogenising Sudan’s ethnically diverse landscape and create a solely Arab national 
identity. Both this economic and cultural marginalisation meant that ethnic groups around the 
country resisted their position as second rank citizens and would eventually fight for their own 
region, people and culture with which they would identify with more than the Arab identity, 
looking for equal rights and more autonomy or a local, autonomous state.212 According to Jok, 
it was always the question whether it was desirable after independence that Sudan would stay 
united. It is simply too diverse and its colonial history of favouring a small educated and 
influential elite in the capital and marginalising the rest is problematic. However, the ICG 
persists in striving for a national solution in Sudan, despite the fact that they acknowledge that 
some marginalised groups rather want local solutions for their grievances. The lack of national 
identity building meant that ethnic groups always expressed more loyalty to their own region 
and ethnic group than the Arab central government far away in the capital. 213 This is discussed 
in recent reports by the ICG, but they do not implement this in their policy advices. Especially 
in recent conflicts after secession from the south marginalised groups in the border states of 
Sudan rather push for local solutions rather than adopting a national frame.214 Meanwhile the 
ICG hold on to a national solution that is simply unreachable. The ICG showed how national 
dialogues were useless because rebels could not unite and the central government kept abusing 
their power.215 Jok states that it is undesirable and incomprehensible that the old colonial 
borders of many African countries, of which Sudan is one, still exist to this day when looking 
at their multi-ethnic landscape, endless conflicts and the hardships those countries face since 
independence.216 
The civil war of Sudan that has raged since independence almost uninterrupted has been 
well documented. Ever since it has commenced because of economic and ethnic grievances in 
the periphery, the government of Khartoum has only thought in terms of violence rather than 
diplomacy, which in turn meant that rebels react in the same way. Today it is clear that conflict 
with periphery regions is an unsuccessful tactic for the central government. Especially their 
                                                          
212 Jok, Sudan, 27-28. 
213 Idem., 39-45. 
214 ICG, Sudan’s Spreading Conflict (I), 38-39, ICG, Sudan’s Spreading Conflict (II), 26-27 & ICG, Sudan’s 
Spreading Conflict (III), 30-33. 
215 ICG, National Dialogue, 5. 
216 Jok, Sudan, 84. 
44 
 
scorched earth tactics, with which they explicitly targeted civilians to destroy their property and 
displace them to camps has led to further escalation and militarisation of marginalised ethnic 
groups around Sudan. The central government of Khartoum systematically planned these 
attacks on civilians of ethnic groups that either supported or has troops in the SPLM in rebel 
territory. Once these people were in the government controlled camps for IDPs, there was no 
way out for them anymore. Not only the army of the central government in Khartoum were 
guilty of these actions. The northern elite supported Arab tribal militias in the periphery, like 
the Murahaleen and the Janjaweed, as well. These Arab groups were manipulated by the 
government to fight their cause and attack rebel forces and scare civilians away from their 
homes and defend the Arab identity of the central government. Armed militias were also 
deployed to force people in IDP camps, to intimidate them to adopt the Arab culture and the 
Islamic faith or to make women slaves.217 The central government of Khartoum tried to 
forcefully make a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society mono-ethnic and mono-religious: 
Arabic and Islamic, forcing ethnic groups in the periphery to revolt.218 Recent reports by the 
ICG showed that in recent times they even targeted former allied Arab militias in periphery 
regions, showing the regime’s goal of keeping power and resources at any cost.219 It is true that 
in some regions the destruction of villages, property and the killing and displacing of civilians 
has been more frequent than in others. The central government of Khartoum not only tried to 
have marginalised ethnic groups adopt Arab culture with their tactics. It was also a means to 
cleanse the ground, or scorch the earth, in order to extract resources from the ground or 
redistribute fertile soil. Especially in regions with vast oil fields and good farmland has the 
fighting and destroying of villages been the fiercest.220  
Especially in IDP camps in and around Khartoum has the Arabisation of the IDPs 
distressingly been the case, because work was made nearly impossible for international aid 
workers and journalists in these camps or entry was not even allowed in the first place, which 
meant that government workers and militia groups were free to intimidate, bully and rape IDPs 
in those camps.221 Especially children were the victims of indoctrination by the work of the 
government in IDP camps in and around Khartoum especially. Adults were more reluctant to 
adopt Islam and Arab culture for reasons of pride and often chose to set up economic activities 
of their own in order to survive, like brewing beer, which is forbidden under the Islamic laws 
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of Sudan. When there was the suspicion of brewing in a camp by the central government, people 
who were guilty are mostly put in prison or IDP camps where living conditions probably are 
even worse. In some cases the elite also ordered to completely destroy IDP camps, forcing them 
from one place to another without any forward notice, destroying what little property they 
had.222 Removal, re-location and re-planning was especially common around the capital of 
Sudan, because of suspicion of alcohol brewing or to start new housing programmes for the 
Arab Islamic population of the capital. New camps were then situated farther away from the 
capital Khartoum in order to cut off access to labour opportunities in the capital for IDPs.223 
With their constant resort to violence rather than dialogue, even against peaceful 
protesting and innocent civilians, the riverain elite of Khartoum run the risk of having more 
periphery regions in Sudan wanting to secede, as the reports by the ICG show. Even after the 
closing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which could have been a possible change for 
the country, the lack of implementation of the accord, the continuing distrust between different 
parties and lack of clarity about welfare sharing and possible solutions for the IDPs has meant 
that the south is now seceded from the rest of Sudan with a referendum. After that evidence 
shows that the central government still resort to violence, economic marginalisation and 
Arabisation in other periphery regions without success and continuing rebellion. Now that the 
south is seceded from the north, Jok is convinced that other periphery regions of Sudan will 
also look for the opportunity to secede which could lead to the complete disintegration of 
Sudan.224 Despite the clear willingness of periphery regions to look for local solutions and 
independence, the ICG holds on to their advice of a national solution where both the central 
government would have a national dialogue with a united periphery. However, with the 
continuing abuse of power by the central government and the mistrust of periphery groups the 
ICG also underline that a national solution is difficult to accomplish.  
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4. Conclusion 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan are countries that have had similar problems throughout 
their history. Despite the work of the international community in both countries, there is still 
stagnation, conflict and ethnic grievances in both countries. This is why I asked: why is the 
international community powerless to solve the IDP issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Sudan? In order to answer the main question, it was necessary set up chapters that go into 
theoretical, historiographical and contextual aspects concerning IDPs and the history of both 
countries. Finally, an analytical question closely related to the main question was answered on 
the developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan that will expose the insolubility of the 
issues in both countries. In order to analyse the influence of the international community, I used 
the reports from the non-profit non-governmental organisation (NGO) called the International 
Crisis Group (ICG) for this analysis: despite years of efforts on the conducting of policy advices 
to local governments and the international community by the ICG, why do the problems of 
IDPs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan remain unresolved? With the ICG establishing 
itself in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the capital of Sudan’s neighbouring country Kenya 
there was a clear signal of intent that they were prepared to work on a better future for both 
countries.  
In the business of governance, the success of a NGO like the ICG is based on their 
ability to find sustainable solutions in crisis situations. The ICG is a respected organisation that 
has existed since the end of the wars in the Balkans. In both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan 
my research has shown they have been unsuccessful thus far to take away the reasons IDPs do 
not want to return. After years of advice the same issues still exist and their advice is not 
implemented. In the theoretical section I discussed two sets of theories on IDPs and migration 
management and policy. I formulated seven reasons why IDPs do not want to return on the 
grassroots level. Both the ICG and the international community have not created the basis for 
IDPs to trust that return is sustainable. Fears of insecurity, discrimination, persecution, 
marginalisation, lack of economic opportunities and violence against minorities or IDPs are still 
not taken away. In both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan pessimism still exists under IDPs 
because the ICG and the international community have faced is found on the migration 
management and policy level, especially in local power constellations. This is how the two sets 
of theory are connected and why both are important. The success of the ICG primarily rests on 
the willingness of local governments and the international community to implement their advice 
which leads to optimism on the grassroots level. In both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan, it 
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has become clear that local governments are unwilling to follow up the recommendations of 
NGOs like the ICG, which in turn has led to pessimism under IDPs. In both countries there is 
mistrust between different parties that is difficult to overcome. Local governments, politicians 
and groups only pursue their own ideals rather than national and international interests. 
Something that has been difficult to reverse for the ICG in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan. 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina the Dayton Peace Agreement divided Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
to sharply divided ethnic blocs. Especially the recognition of Republika Srpska via the 
agreement is problematic according to the ICG, because it gave the Serb entity the possibility 
to uphold the radical political ideas for which it participated in the civil war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: an ethnically cleansed Serb area free from Bosniaks and Croats that could 
eventually join Serbia. Sustainable solutions are not giving by the ICG apart from the 
advocating of inclusive politics and diversity as they have done for many years in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, but it is clear this has not changed anything. The ICG showed that politics of 
segregation existed ever since independence from Yugoslavia and they have not organised or 
called for any meetings between ethnic groups to overcome the deeply rooted mistrust.  
In Sudan the relations between various ethnic groups in conflict is also highly 
problematic. The elite of Khartoum has only reacted to the grievances of marginalised groups 
with violence ever since independence in 1956, which in turn has led to those groups resisting 
their position as second-class citizens while also building and insurmountable mistrust towards 
the government. Therefore marginalised groups in Sudan want more autonomy and do not seek 
the national solution that the ICG recommends. Even though the ICG recognised the will of 
marginalised groups to seek local solutions, they persisted in their advice for a national peace 
process and unlike in Bosnia and Herzegovina both the international community and local 
groups implemented one of its reccomendations. Despite the fact that the ICG went beyond the 
merely advisory role as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and had more vigour with the call for 
national talks in Sudan, these national peace processes were a farce. The West and the ICG are 
trapped in formulating solutions in a solitary state, while insiders think in local solutions. The 
real issue of Sudan is best described by Jok Madut Jok and lies in its colonial history. According 
to the Sudanese born Jok this crucial aspect to understand the current state of affairs in Sudan 
is missed by the West, making his analysis crucial in this thesis since the ICG is a Western 
organisation. The colonial history of Sudan created an imposed unity of hundreds of different 
ethnic groups that had not existed before. The British colonial rulers also created an educated 
Arab riverain elite class in the capital and marginalised all other groups. After independence, 
the riverain elite filled the void left behind by the British and would be even more radical than 
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their predecessors. For decades unity was indeed the goal of marginalised groups and a multi-
ethnic Sudan free of discrimination was their pursuit. However, after the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement it has become clear that marginalised groups rather look for local solutions, more 
autonomy and possible secession, because the elite of Khartoum are unwilling to change their 
ways and keep all power within their own group. With a better understanding of Sudan’s 
history, a Western organisation like the ICG would understand that a national solution is 
unreachable and would not have made it their main argument to solve the country’s crises.  
The ICG do not have the mandate to push for change. They are only an advisory 
organisation and cannot implement their policies themselves and rely on local and international 
organisations to do so. Despite the lack of sustainable solutions and change in both Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Sudan the ICG still exists. This is probably because it has many powerful 
donors, like the United Nations and the European Union and the World Bank. First, its donors 
might benefit from the existence of the ICG, because it means it can still seek solutions on the 
ground in crisis situations while not having to send military forces. Second, the position of the 
ICG is also difficult, because it is not in a position to undermine the interests of its donors in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan. This means that its neutrality might be questionable 
because the ICG works with a scope that fits its donors. The ICG did underscore the problematic 
case of Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina in a report in 2001 and 2002 and that it 
would be better to undo the two entities that exist in the country, but it do not explore this 
possibility afterwards. It is possible that the ICG does not have the mandate to push this 
argument, because some of its donors took part in formulating the Dayton Peace Agreement 
and have no interest in replacing it. In Sudan the ICG did recognise the will of periphery groups 
that want local solutions and ultimately secession, but it holds on to the solitary state regardless. 
This is probably because the United States and China, two important countries in the 
international community, have certain interests regarding the war on terror and oil import that 
means they do not want to undermine the elite of Khartoum, making it difficult for the UN to 
put real pressure on the central government. The conclusion now is that as long as the ICG does 
not have true power and authority and cannot work entirely freely from certain investors, all its 
work is for nothing in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sudan. 
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